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 Changing Politics in Central Asia 
The Case of Kazakhstan  
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last few years, global politics faced multiple changes affecting the current world 
political situation. This change of political strategies in foreign policy did not only occur in 
industrialized countries such as the USA or of the EU, and Russia, but also influenced the 
development of many developing countries. The power of the latter countries depends on their 
geopolitical location and allocation of natural resources. Since 2006/2007, the major topics of 
different political world summits mainly contained issues concerning oil and gas distribution. A 
war for independency and “democratic future” broke out within the battlefield of energy and 
power. Routes and maps were all about pipelines and the world political agenda almost 
exclusively focused on energy. An era of new politics had begun. The formation process of a 
new political climate lasted for almost three years, from 2006 to 2009 and still goes on.  The 
world depends on the stability of the financial situation and on sufficient energy resources. 
Single players misused the power of having energy resources to manipulate other political 
systems or countries. There was no sanction to prevent such a policy or behavior.  During these 
three years, the global economy had to face a worldwide financial crisis. European governments 
started to collaborate to find solutions for this tremendous issue. Further, this financial crisis 
revealed that oil and gas prices are important measures to demonstrate strength and power; for 
instance, European countries recognized their dependency from Russia, which forced them to 
search for other energy sources.   
Countries affecting the world policy such as the US, Russia, and the European Union received 
new leaders, again influencing world politics. The former American foreign policy, regarded as 
‘hard power’ ended with Barack Obama’s election victory when he became the first African 
American President in November 2008 (he took office in January 2009). Nowadays, being 
almost a year in office, Obama’s foreign policy still remains unclear and is a rather ‘soft’ policy of 
meetings and negotiations. On the other hand, the new Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, 
taking office in 2008 from former President Vladimir Putin, who had an indisputable political 
influence inside and outside of Russia and who gave Russian foreign policy a ‘strong’ power, 
continues his  type of policy. Additionally, several member countries (MS) of the European 
Union had political changes. In 2005, Germany elected the new chancellor Angela Merkel. She 
is the first female German chancellor as well as the youngest German chancellor since the 
Second World War. Within her term, she established reforms that strengthened Germany’s 
voice inside and outside of the EU. Nicolas Sarcozy is new president in France. After taking 
office in May 2007, he promised strong reforms to revitalize the French economy. Dal 
Grybauskaitė became the first female head of state in Lithuania on July 12
th, 2009. Beforehand, Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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she was serving as the Lithuania's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finance Minister, and 
European Commissioner for Financial Programming and the Budget. The elections for the 
European Parliament in the 27 member states between 4
th and 7
th June 2009 were another 
political event. These elections represented the biggest trans-national elections in history and 
considered the EU as a single state for the first time. 
Within the last few years of the media development, new communications started to play a 
bigger role in influencing policy, mostly on national level and in developing countries with 
authoritarian regime. The power of the new media and its fast speed of penetration and ability to 
reach a high amount of people to change things are demonstrated by Barack Obama’s election 
campaign that attracted its auditorium mainly via twitter.com and facebook.com. It further helped 
to fundraise enough money for him and his candidates. Another example of the influence of the 
new mass media was obvious during the presidential elections in June 2009 held in Iran, where 
the attention of the world community to the intolerance and severity of existing power machine 
as well as unfair elections was attracted. In Moldova, the power of new media brought 
thousands of people on the streets to protest against communism and unfair elections and 
made the European Union to help establishing another election. All these events, among others, 
provoked governments to think about their foreign policy strategies and sometimes to undertake 
changes in their approaches to find the most stable way of growth and development. However, 
as history and analysis show, the different approaches cannot be seen as ultimate solutions. 
Joseph Nye, co-founder of the neoliberalism, the international relations theory, the concept of 
asymmetrical and complex interdependence, and creator of the term ‘soft power’, which is often 
used by the current US administration, has written in his book “US Power and Strategy After 
Iraq”: “Hard power will always remain crucial in a world of nation-states guarding their 
independence, but soft power will become increasingly important in dealing with the 
transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation for their solution” (NYE JR. 2003). He 
also writes that “world politic is changing in a way that makes it impossible for the strongest 
world power … to achieve some of its most crucial international goals alone. On many of today's 
key issues, such as international financial stability, drug trafficking, the spread of diseases, and 
especially the new terrorism, military power alone simply cannot produce success. Instead, as 
the most powerful country, must mobilize international coalitions to address these shared 
threats and challenges” (NYE JR. 2003). 
This paper examines how the policy of Kazakhstan changed during the last few years. It 
compares the foreign policy from the past with current changes regarding the influence of major 
external players such as the European Union. The paper also provides an analysis of foreign 
policy as well as a describtion of world critics and possible negative aspects. The author 
believes that complex relations based on ‘smart soft power’ may lead to win-win situations, but 
where stakes are too high using ‘hard power’ methods may be appropiate.  Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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2. CENTRAL ASIA TODAY 
Central Asia emerged as a bridgehead for political actions on the world scene with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Several external world players tried to win the region over to profit 
from its potential (not stable governance, advantageous geostrategic placement, rich natural 
energy sources). “In spite of  the majority expectations, today a geography will define the fate of 
Central Asia, but not its culture” (GOBL 1997), - resumed the deputy director for broadcasting of 
the “Radio Liberty\Free Europe”, member of the editorial board of “Central Asia” magazine Paul 
A. Gobl. “After the reconstruction of own independency five Central Asian countries had to 
decide towards three different maps: old map, uniting them into ex-Soviet Union and to Moscow; 
own regional map, defining internal borders and lines of inner interactions; new map, resumes 
the relations with the rest of the world” (GOBL 1997).  
To describe Central Asia, with a focus on Kazakhstan, and to precisely calculate the geopolitical 
situation, the following paragraphs will describe the region as well as define external and 
internal powers. Further, Kazakhstan will serve as an example to understand the main driving 
political forces in the region and to explain the change of power balance and strategies over the 
past years.  
2.1 Regional Description 
“The idea of Central Asia as a distinct region of the world was introduced in 1843 by the 
geographer Alexander von Humboldt” (MANDELBAUM 1994). However, there is no clear definition 
from that time. Several textbooks call the area ‘Turkestan’ (as one Central Asian city), some 
refers to the Soviet name ‘Middle Asia’ which includes Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan was not part of Middle Asia because of its geographical location 
with one half in Asia and the other half in Europe. The term ‘Central Asia’ had a broader 
meaning. According to “the UNESCO general history of Central Asia, Central Asia includes 
Mongolia, Western China (including Tibet), Northeast Iran, Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 
Central-East Russia south of the Taiga, and the former Central Asian Soviet Republics (the five 
"Stans" of the former Soviet Union), but also even the Punjab, Northern India and Pakistan” 
(MANDELBAUM 1994).  Despite the geographical origin of this definition, the determination of 
Central Asia became more political and was narrowed down to five ex-Soviet republics after 
1991. “The leaders of the five former Soviet Central Asian Republics met in Tashkent and 
declared that the definition of Central Asia should include Kazakhstan as well as the original 
four included countries by the Soviets. Since then, this became the most common definition of 
Central Asia” (MANDELBAUM 1994).  
Central Asia has a huge territory, changing political regimes, transitional and developing 
economies, potential markets, and rich energy sources. It also has beneficial geostrategic 
location and, therefore, is a possible clash of interest of both external and internal players. 
Comparing the size of territory, economic and social development, as well as the strategic Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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location, together with the international political image and position of power, the Central Asian 
countries can be divided into two groups. Kazakhstan depicts one group, while the other four 
countries are the other group. Additionally, there are a number of other unifying and 
distinguishing factors. These factors can help external players to better understand regional 
behaviors, but also may lead to confusion. 
 
Population  
Statistics show about 58 m. people living in Central Asia: in Kazakhstan (2005 - 14,825,000m
1
), 
in Kyrgyzstan (July 2005 - 5,264,000m.
2
), in Tajikistan (July 2005 - 6,507,000m.
3
), in 
Turkmenistan (July 2005 - 4,833,000m.
4





Two different major language groups can be identified, namely the native languages and the 
Russian language. Regarding the native languages, Central Asian countries belong to the 
Turkic language group. They differ, but have the same roots. Thus, “Turkmen, closely related to 
Turkish (they are both members of the Oghuz group of Turkic), is mainly spoken in 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tatar are related languages 
of the Kypchak group of Turkic languages, and are spoken throughout Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. Uzbek and Uighur are spoken in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Xinjiang”
6
. The own 
native languages unify the region. They are more spoken and have a bigger influence in the 
south of Kazakhstan and in the other four countries. The strongest predominance of the native 
languages can be noticed in villages and small towns in rural areas. Regarding the Russian 
language usage, Kazakhstan is the country with the highest usage (“The majority of modern 
Kazakhstanis are currently either ethnic Kazakhs (58%-60%) or Russians (25%-27%), with 
smaller Ukrainian, Uzbek, German, Uyghur, Koreans and other minorities totaling 15%-17%”
7
). 
The Russian group constitutes 25-27% with minorities (15-17%. In addition, at least half of the 
Kazakh group (mainly from Northern part) speaks Russian (30%). Thus, 70% of the people 
speak Russian. The native language usage of Central Asian countries makes Central Asia be 
closer to Islamic Asian countries in the East. The Russian language usage makes Central Asia 
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be closer to Russia from a historical and language perspective (migration of people after 1991). 
Kazakhstan can be considered as a base for other foreign countries to start political 
conversations and actions in Central Asia – since most of the English speaking people live in 
Astana, Almaty, Atyrau (Kazakhstan).  
 
Political regimes 
It could be assumed that according to the territory unification and the common language in 
Central Asia that these countries may seem to have similar political regimes. But, all five 
republics declare different types of political governance. However, they have a common political 
past by being ruled (till 2005) by Soviet diplomats who won the presidential elections in 1991. 
Only in Kyrgyzstan, after the ‘Tulip revolution’ in 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiev became the 
President after Askar Akaev (in 2009 re-elected for the second term). Theoretically, ‘Kazakhstan 
is a constitutional republic with a strong presidency. Kyrgyzstan defines the form of the 
government as a democratic republic. Tajikistan was plunged into a civil war, allegedly backed 
by Russia and Iran, fighting one another. In 1997, the war stopped and a central government 
began to shape with peaceful elections in 1999. Tajikistan is officially a republic and holds 
elections for the President and Parliament. Constitutionally, the Government of Uzbekistan 
provides democracy. Politics of Turkmenistan take place under a totalitarian dictatorship, 
whereby the President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, retains absolute control over the 
country and no opposition is tolerated (author correction – this situation happened to be before 
2006 while the president Niyazov was alive).”
8
. After the first president of the republic of 
Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, died, the office was taken by Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhammedov, who was elected by the people. However, some political analysts write 
that “although the new Turkmen President, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, has taken the 
initiative of transforming Turkmenistan from a closed dictatorial state to an open democracy, no 
significant substantial change has been seen so far” (SARA 2007). An indicative factor on how 
much democracy is happening, for example during the presidential elections, could be drawn 
from the importance, the country gives to external players, such as the US or EU. Most of the 
elections were seen by western observers as unfair, whereas Russian and CIS observers 
indicated ‘good reforms’. International observers still think that people in Central Asia are under 
a similar political pressure as during Soviet times. But, for instance, according to research done 
by the International Research Institute ‘InterMedia’ (Washington, DC) in Kazakhstan before the 
Presidential elections in December 2005, 71% of interviewees would have voted for the current 
President Nazarbayev because the life conditions met people’s needs. They think that the 
current policy would be stable and life conditions well enough (JETPYSPAYEVA 2005).  
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Table 1. Central Asian Presidents 
COUNTRY LEADER  TERM 


















Uzbekistan Islom  Karimov  (1991-on) 
 
Religion 
Central Asian countries are mostly Islamic. The second most religion is Orthodox Christian. 
Under the constitutional law, the church is separated from the state. Few years ago, when the 
US started the “War on Terror campaign” in Central Asia and stationed their army in Kyrgyzstan, 
some radical Islamic organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir appeared. But a major political 
scientists, such as Oleg Sidorov, the Advisor of the Director General, Central Asian Foundation 
for Democracy Development, think that “radical Islam is just a political game played by US to 
take physical place in Central Asia (military bases) and Central Asian countries to balance the 
power and have more than one trump card in political game” (SIDOROV 2006). 
 
Economy 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of industrial and economic complex, 
the republics of Central Asia faced a crisis (1991). Using their natural resources and economic 
relations, the five Central Asian countries tried to establish new activities and reform their 
economy. They were declared as countries with a transition economy which highly depended on 
natural resource export (mainly oil, gas, minerals) and agriculture (especially republics located 
in the South – cotton, tobacco, sugar, wheat, etc.). “According to evaluation, the share of 
enterprises in private and mixed sectors of economy in late 90s in Kazakhstan fell about 77% of 
working force and 55% of GDP; in Kyrgyzstan - conformably 73 and 70%; in Tajikistan – 61-62 




                                                  
9
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Natural resources 
“Natural resources are very abundant in Kazakhstan, not only in quantity of the specific 
resources, such as petroleum, but also in the abundance of different elements. Out of 110 
chemical elements 99 are present, and 60 are being extracted. The deposits of oil, gas, 
titanium, magnesium, tin, uranium, and gold are some of the biggest in the world. Significant 
deposits of coal, iron, copper, zinc are also present. Kazakhstan holds 300 gold deposits and is 
the 6th largest supplier of gold in the world. The country is also an exporter of diamonds. Large 
deposits of chemicals are also present. Petroleum, natural gas, and mineral exports have 
attracted most of the over $40 billion in foreign investment in Kazakhstan since 1993” (CIA 
WORLD FACTBOOK 2009, ENTRY ON KAZAKHSTAN). In Turkmenistan, there was a conflict about 
gas between the Ukraine and Russian ‘Gasprom’, depending on Turkmen natural recourses: “it 




Regional political cooperation and alliances 
Since their independence, all Central Asian countries are involved in regional security and 
economic organizations with other CIS countries. They are in the United Economic Area, the 
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Table 2. External Powers Interests In Central Asia 
Power Interest  sphere 
US  Military: the base for military forces to support military operations in 
Afghanistan and War on Terror as well as to protect economic interest 
of US companies in the region. 
Economic: export of natural resources, manly oil; possible reserve 
base of oil till 2010. 
Geostrategic: have an access to the East, Central Asia, Russian and 
Chinese borders, Caspian sea and be present in this region to maintain 
the political power.   
EU  Economic: mainly bilateral agreement relations between EU countries 
(Germany, UK mostly) and Central Asian countries were established. 
Since 2007, the EU adopted the common strategy on Central Asia that 
changes slightly the role of a ‘peaceful observer’ that EU played before 
2007, but still the policy is mainly about helping to establish business 
relations and holding the political and economic negotiations. 
Geostrategic: be present in every part of the world especially where 
US is also present.  
Russia   Military:  holds bases in Kyrgyzstan and behaves as ‘big brother’ 
balancing the US. Tries to provide the military support of economic 
interest and holds good domestic relations (policy with Central Asia still 
viewed more as domestic than foreign). 
Economic: export of natural resources (oil, gas), bilateral agreements 
on trade, main Kazakhstan’s trading partner. 
Geostrategic: protects its borders and be present in the region to 
balance power of the US and react to possible political actions. 
China  Security: protection of its borders (have one border with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), cares about stability in Sinzyan Uighur 
Autonomous Region, NATO as a threat, fear of religious extremism.  
Economic: export of natural resources, mainly oil.  
Geostrategic: control of borders and balance the power of the US, 
observing the US actions and possibility to react on actions.  
Iran, Turkey, 
India, etc. 
Economic: economic partnership and relations development, oil.  




Economic:  trade interconnections, export/import, industrial complex 
relations, energy sources interest.  
Geostrategic: cooperation within regional organizations, partnership. 
 Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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2.2. Power Focus 
The power balance and influence in the region of Central Asia can be divided into two main 
categories, i.e. internal and external development dimensions. Relations between Central Asian 
countries can be called internal dimension. Together with current problems such as visa regime 
negotiations, borders delimitations questions, common anti-criminal operations, migration, 
tourism, and business activities questions, which are solved on bilateral basis or under the roof 
of integrated communities, all countries seem to be equal.  
Starting with a significant economic growth within the past few years, Kazakhstan increased its 
influence in the world and its perceived image. With this expanding business and political 
power, the country seems to begin to dominate in the Central Asia region. This sub-dimension 
appeared in 2006-2007 and slowed down due to the global financial crisis and the Kazakhstani 
banking system reforming process (Kazakhstani banking system was the best example among 
post-Soviet countries that together with oil and gas industry contributes to the main budget 
income. Kazakhstani banks successfully expanded their business in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, 
and Kyrgyzstan, etc. In times of crisis, the government of Kazakhstan started to support banks 
to survive via partial nationalization. This process is not finished yet). 
Looking on the region from an external perspective, there are several powers that ‘crossed their 
swords’ to gain influence in the region by trying to obtain physical presence (such as military 
contingent placement) or economic interactions (by the amount of trade-offs, contracts, volumes 
of import-export, number of companies presented by country, etc.). The Central Asian region 
has a multidimensional power situation. The most obvious questions of powers appear in 
military\security, economic, and geostrategic spheres. The influence of external power is shared 
between two major groups. Four major players practice an active policy to pursue their own 
national interests. The others have an observational role to be able to react in emergency case. 
The internal dimension shows the interaction between Central Asian republics with a more or 
less partnership between four equal players and Kazakhstan, where Kazakhstan acts as the 
main financial and energy investor and as an initiator of regional cooperation. Being the richest 
country in the region with a high potential of natural resources, Kazakhstan can be expected to 
gain more power in the nearest future.  
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2.3. Country Focus: Kazakhstan
11
     
Capital: Astana, Largest city – Almaty 
Official language(s): Kazakh (state language), Russian 
Government: Democratic Republic declared under the Constitution 
President: Nursultan Nazarbayev since 1991 
Prime Minister: Karim Massimov 
Independence from the Soviet Union: Declared December 16, 1991  
Area: 2,717,300 km² (9th) 
Population: 14,825,000 (62nd) (2005) 
Population density: 5.6/km² (215th) 
GDP (PPP): 2005 estimate, Total $132.7 billion (56th), Per capita $8,700 (70th) 
Currency: Tenge (KZT) 
Kazakhstan (officially: Republic of Kazakhstan) is the biggest country among the Central Asian 
republics and also the ninth largest country in the world by its territory, but only the 62nd by its 
population. Located in Central Asia, it is mostly part of Eastern Europe. It has borders with 
Russia, the People's Republic of China, and the Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, and a coastline on the Caspian Sea
12
.  
Positive description: A positive description could be grounded on two main aspects as stated 
by the European Commission: “The first is the rich oil and natural gas reserves in the west of 
the country, and offshore in the Caspian Sea, which have attracted some $34 billion in Foreign 
Direct Investment since 1991, and which have therefore inspired Kazakhstan’s recent economic 
boom. The second is the pragmatic manner in which President Nazarbayev has overseen the 
country’s transition towards a secular, capitalist society whilst maintaining a relatively high level 
of social cohesion”
13
. Kazakhstan is a fast growing economy mostly based on the export of oil. It 
is also very rich in minerals. After the collapse of Soviet economy, during last 15 years, 
Kazakhstan has demonstrated stable growth and a policy oriented, not only into export and 
usage of mineral and energy sources, but also into reconstruction of its production and industrial 
base. For instance, the oil processing complex was renovated in order to clean the oil from 
paraffin ‘at home’.  The oil received a higher value and, thus, a higher price, which renovated 
the oil-based income.  
“The government of Kazakhstan plans to double its GDP by 2008 and triple by 2015 compared 
to 2000. The GDP growth was stable in the last five years, and was higher than 9% (the second 
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fastest growing economy in the world in real terms). Analysts estimate a 9.3% growth rate for 
2005”
14
. “Energy is the leading economic sector. Production of crude oil and natural gas 
condensate in Kazakhstan amounted to 51.2 million tons in 2003 (8.6% more than in 2002). 
Kazakhstan raised its oil and gas condensate exports to 44.3 million tons in 2003. Gas 
production in 2003 amounted to 13.9 billion cubic meters, including natural gas production of 7.3 
billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan holds about 4 billion tons of proven recoverable oil reserves 
and 2,000 cubic kilometers of gas. Industry analysts believe that planned expansion of oil 
production, coupled with the development of new fields, will enable the country to produce as 
much as 3 million barrels per day by 2015, lifting Kazakhstan into the ranks of the world's top 10 
oil-producing nations.
15
 By using the “black gold money” the country actively invests into the 
economy and establishes an attractive investment climate. Although, during last years, when 
the influence of Kazakhstan on the world stage grew as well as oil price, Kazakhstan started to 
toughen ecological laws obliging international oil and gas companies to utilize petroleum gas 
and to try increasing the utilization barrier by 100%. This shortens the oil extraction speed. 
Kazakhstan is the first country among CIS members, which successfully introduced an 
accumulating pension system in 1998. Kazakhstani pension funds had a positive balance, were 
fast growing, and invested in the local and international stock market. Despite of the US dollar 
dependence export, the inflation rate demonstrated stability over last few years and hold on the 
7% level (before the crisis happened summer-autumn 2008, when KZT fall down, and inflation 
rate grew up to 15%). Before the crisis in 2008, the banking system of Kazakhstan was the most 
stable and progressive among the CIS countries. In 1998, the country went through the bank 
crisis in Russia without any loses and was constantly growing. By 2008, it unified 34 banks of 
the second level, 14 of which consisted of foreign capital. “Banking sector of the country holds 
high growth rates. Today it could be established that the closest banking market – Russian – is 
filled with many Kazakhstani banks directly or indirectly. The share of Kazakhstani capital on 
Russian banking market will grow. Summary assets of Kazakhstani banks grew in 2005 on 68% 
from US $14.6 billions to 24.6 billions. In comparison, aggregated income of Russian banks on 
1
st of July 2005 constitutes of US $278.04 billions. Therefore, in Kazakhstan 45% of market 
share belongs to first two banks of second level, and in Russia - only 35%. The capitalization of 
Kazakhstani banks grew in first six month of 2005 comparing to first six month of 2004 on 62% 
from 1.5 billions of USD to 2.5 billions of USD. In Russia the capitalization of the market dwelled 
on 34.5 billions of USD according to data on 1
st of July, 2005”
16
. Kazakhstan demonstrates 
stable economic growth and constant improvement of investment climate, which is proven by 
international audit agencies. In 2006, Kazakhstan launched its own satellite – KazSat. 
Kazakhstan demonstrated a peaceful image by neglecting to use military force in politics. The 
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country, with more than 100 different nationalities, has never experienced civil conflicts, rejected 
the use of nuclear weapons, and was granted to hold the presidency chair OSCE by 2010 – to 
show “the optimal system of cross-national harmony maintenance, the main principal of which is 
the dialogue between society and government” (NAZARBAYEV 2006). Kazakhstan is an active 
member of international organizations and regional communities. Analyzing the foreign press, 
one may found Kazakhstan is more often called as the main regional leader and investor in 
Central Asia. Additionally, the head of the European Commission in Kazakhstan, Adrian van der 
Meer, characterized the life conditions and economic level in the country as improving: 
“Kazakhstan will turn from transit country into country of arrival” (VAN DER MEER 2005). 
Negative description: Analysts say that the image of the country of being a tolerant country 
executing a rather ‘soft’ foreign policy, holding rich mineral and energy resources, and being 
ruled by a rather ‘young’ government with whom it is easy to negotiate, is wrong. Being a very 
rich country in terms of mineral reserves, Kazakhstan is providing strong domestic and foreign 
policies with using the energy reserves as an instrument to gain or maintain a higher influence 
in any negotiations. Since 2006-2007, after getting more attention from international countries 
and companies and after adopting strategies by the EU and the increase of oil extraction 
volumes by foreign companies working in the republic, the country started to perform a policy, 
where the energy matter is used for the protection of own interests such as independence, 
stability, and peace. This kind of policy is seen as a possible negative outcome that may harm 
the country’s development.  
Once the USSR collapsed, all industrial and economic ties were destroyed and the country 
faced problems with reforming the whole system. Kazakhstan needed to reform educational, 
medical, financial, military, and other systems. During the reforms, the country faced high rates 
of unemployment, low wage rates, and a growing social instability. All together, it caused a 
social damage including a growth of corruption, which still occurs. A declared free market 
economy started to develop itself. The imperfection of a legislation basis intensified this 
negative effect of the corruption level and being a ‘tasty morsel’
17
.  
Kazakhstan attracted direct investments into extraction and production of natural resources and 
mining. The country depended on these investments and had no influence on the use of the 
resources which caused enormous problems for the ecological environment. Now, the country is 
trying to toughen the ecological legislation and oblige the investors to utilize the petroleum gas. 
At that time, the Kazakh economy needed stable investments that leaded to a 15 years lease of 
oil fields to foreign oil companies together with introducing soft ecological norms and conditions. 
With a free market economy, the country opened up to NGOs and international organizations. 
Since the iron curtain is down, the world became aware of a number of issues from inside the 
country. New media became a perfect tool for manipulating or hostage an informational war and 
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a source to pressure the government. “In recent years, there have been a number of 
developments in the human rights situation in Kazakhstan. One of the most notable changes 
was the announcement of an open-ended moratorium on the death penalty at the end of 
December 2003. Reforms of the prison and judicial systems are also ongoing, whereas an 
independent Ombudsman’s office, with a mandate to work on economic and social rights, was 
established in 2002. Such positive developments have, however, often been overshadowed by 
well-publicized crackdowns on media outlets, opposition groups, and non-governmental bodies 
that have been critical of government policies and corruption”
18
. 
Another reason for the international criticism is the third-term presidency of Nursultan 
Nazarbayev (although officially it is the second-term due to legislation change) which started in 
December 2005 with 90% of all votes. Some argue that Nazarbayev does not want to quit the 
office due to personal reasons and financial benefits. “The main opponent Zharmakhan 
Tuyakbai lead a movement called ‘For a Fair Kazakhstan’ and argued for an independent re-
examination of the privatization deals, and contracts involving the country’s leading resource 
industries, which Nazarbayev contended, were illegally benefiting officials close to the 
President’s family, and thereby damaging the national economy”
19
. The elections were criticized 
by OSCE stating that “the election did not meet a number of OSCE commitment and other 
international standards for democratic elections
20
.  
Several independent interviews and research, done before the elections in Kazakhstan, show 
that people were satisfied with Nazarbayev because they liked his policy and thought the 
country’s situation would aggravate if he resigned. People could not see an opposition force that 
would have successfully ruled the country.  
The opinions after the election can be divided into two groups. Even independent observers 
may have different opinions. Usually, observers from pro-Kazakhstani countries (CIS) declared 
the elections as fair while Western countries declared them as unfair. Such kind of pressure and 
battle between external players can be observed, when the country is considered as a ‘tasty 
morsel’. The interest in energy or other resources defines the policy of main external players in 
the region and, therefore, influences the foreign policy performed by the county itself and may 
affect even the society. Everybody who is involved, politicians, media, and citizens, are affected. 
The outcome of a politic action depends on the right tactic. If a country provides smart foreign 
policies it can gain politic allies, interests, attract money, get IMF loans. If the country does not 
make political decisions which are favored by foreign governments, it may be possible that the 
current government will be replaced. The country may even face a capture. Kazakhstan’s 
politics changed from year to year whiles changes were closely related to policies executed by 
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external players in the region. After the collapse of the USSR (early 1990s), Kazakhstan’s 
economy was weak and the state expected Western investments. Therefore, it performed a 
“likeable policy” for investors including liberalization of the economy and a flexible ecological 
legislation needed for oil and gas producers. Kazakhstan used the incoming investments for the 
development of a reliable banking system, self-production, for a renovation of oil and gas 
production to separate oil from paraffin so its value increased as well did the price. 
Kazakhstan became a country with a stable economy. Due to the denial of nuclear weapon, the 
world religions forum establishment and reforms, the country gained a positive image on the 
global scene and became a reliable partner and investor among CIS (ex-Soviet countries) and 
Central Asia. By 2005-2006, the country has established businesses across its own borders and 
invested in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia and actively appeared on the global stage 
(proposed its candidate for the OSCE chairman position for 2009). 
The country’s behavior in foreign policy changed as well as its power and influence. The change 
was reflected by the improvement and toughening the oil and gas legislation, by a ecological 
measures change, by increasing governmental pressure on foreign companies dealing with oil 
and gas in Kazakhstan. The change of Kazakhstan in foreign politics influenced the world 
community to re-evaluate tactics as well. 2007 is considered as a starting-point for this change. 
That year, the world community addressed certain claims to Kazakhstan that should be 
considered and evaluated in order to gain the OSCE presidency chair. The new foreign policy 
was adopted; the behavior of the country had changed as well as the background rules.  
3. EU POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN 
3.1. Before 2007 
There are many ways to describe the political approach of the European Union. Often, the 
approaches differ from the approaches of the US. The EU foreign policy approach can be 
considered as a ‘soft power’ approach using 'trading state perspective’ and multilateral tools. 
“There are a number of issues over which the United States and Europe generally disagree. 
Some of these are cultural, such as Bush's stance on abortion or the U.S. use of death penalty, 
international issues such as the Middle East peace process, whilst many others are trade 
related. The current U.S. policies are often described as being unilateral in nature, whereas the 
European Union and Canada often take a more multilateral approach, relying more on the 
United Nations and other international institutions to help solve issues”
21
. The EU soft foreign 
policy refers to the EU perception as a trading state, where the main idea is: War Does Not Pay. 
The EU was established to promote common markets and support free trade for benefits of 
member states. The construct of the EU policy can be understood by the policies pillars. “Within 
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each pillar, a different balance is struck between the supranational and intergovernmental 
principles”
22
. This explains why under the EU roof CFSP and its ESDP are of the second 
priority, while mainly domestic policies have the highest priority.  
Setting up together a Union, member states were ready to give up power only, if they would 
benefit from it. Firstly, it was about a free market. There was no question about sovereignty or 
confederation. But later on, these questions became more relevant since not every country was 
ready to give up its sovereignty and maybe lose benefits. The question about equal rights is 
very sensitive. That is why the progress of forming a better EU is still going on. The progress 
can be seen on the pillars, where the first pillar shows operating policies without the Union 
would be a dead structure, but also which does not restrain all actions on a national level. The 
second and third pillars mostly show the time when the EU will be a confederation with all 
sensitive policies on supranational level. From the pillars scheme it is clear that policies 
including trade and social policies are in first pillar. CFSP are in the second pillar including only 
soft measures such as negotiations, conflict prevention, police, and peacekeeping operations or 
reconstruction services after military operations. 
The EU foreign policy not only refers to the European perspective to be a trading state, but 
could be explained by the point of view of the governance system – supranationalism vs. 
intergovernmentalism: “Supranationalism is strongest in the first pillar. Its function generally 
corresponded at first to the three European Communities whose organizational structure had 
already been unified in the 1960s through the Merger Treaty. In the CFSP and PJCC pillars the 
powers of the European Parliament, the Commission and European Court of Justice with 
respect to the Council are significantly limited, without however being altogether eliminated. The 
balance struck in the first pillar is frequently referred to as the "community method", since it is 
that used by the European Community”
23
. 
Talking about the trade policy of the EU, John Peterson and Alasdair Young wrote that “The 
Office of US Trade Representative is a weak bureaucratic player in Washington. The EU Trade 
Commissioner is one of the most formidable institutional actors in the entire EU: hard power that 
comes from being guardian of the EU’s massive market, serviceable system for decision-
making on trade matters”
24
. This process of a free inner market took years. Outside of this inner 
market, the EU acts with a single voice, however, trying to promote the interests of every single 
member state. 
Policies from the second and third pillars are still under construction and will take time as well as 
the will of the member states to complete them. Today, member states are willing to pay (main 
tasks of ESDP are “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks for combat 
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forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”)
25
 approximately €160 billion from EU 25 
stocks
26
, but not wiling to vote for a Constitution Draft which contains such terms as “the EU 
Member States are constitutionally forbidden from pursuing an independent foreign policy and 
must conform to the superior EU foreign policy; all MS, including the neutrals, will be legally 
obliged to provide military resources to the EU and increase their military spending”
27
. 
Similar to the supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism debate is the explanation of active and 
passive foreign policy. This refers to Christopher Hill’s discussion, described in Rosamond’s 
book, about ‘actorness’ and ‘presence’ of the EU in global foreign policy where ‘‘actorness’ is 
about the delimitations of one unit from others, the autonomy of a unit to make its own laws and 
the possession of various structural prerequisites for action at international level and where 
‘presence’ is about ‘reality of a cohesive European impact upon IR despite the messy way in 
which it is produced’
28
. The EU ‘presence’ on the international scene has two elements: “the EU 
exhibits distinctive forms of external behavior and the EU is perceived to be important by other 
actors within the global system”
29
. The EU is more an observer and balancer, while the US is an 
actor. However, the EU may limit actions of the US by its presence.  
There is also a historical explanation on the different political philosophies of the EU and US: 
“The two continents (EU and US) can be the diverging political philosophies on both sides of the 
ocean. European countries do not seek traditional power. They perceive the old power politics 
as the source of the two world wars, which caused so much misery and devastated the 
economies of many countries. That is why European countries nowadays seek peace through 
multilateralism, the consent of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. And not 
because they are military weak, as Kagan argues in his book. The European unification has 
been achieved by rejecting military power as an instrument of international affairs” (KNUDSEN 
2005, P.22). 
“The transatlantic debate over the appropriate responses to perceived threats is at the heart of 
current European-US tensions. The American view has been inclined towards the belief that its 
global strength can be used to defeat the threats posed by terrorism, whereas European views 
have tended to reject the use of force, claiming that threats can only be minimized over time, 
through multilateral efforts to control them at their source” (KNUDSEN 2005, P.22). Europe thinks 
that terror cannot be diminished from the world. “Many Europeans have in fact grown somehow 
used to living with terrorism and they believed from their own historical and colonial experiences 
that stabilizing a post-war Iraq would be nearly impossible. Therefore many Europeans 
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assumed that the risk of the invasion outweighed the benefits. The previous terror campaigns in 
Europe such as the Basque separatists in Spain, the Islamic extremist bombers in Paris, IRA in 
mainland Britain and political extremists in Germany and Italy (Haseler, 2004, p.39) - together 
with the memories of the Second World War, all prove that Europeans could not fully 
understand the sudden sense of American vulnerability or the American response to the new 
threats the worldwide “war on terror”. Europeans agreed with the United States that al-Qaeda 
and other groups posed serious threats, but they had reservations about the idea of a war on 
terror. According to Haseler, Europeans believed that terrorism could never be fully eradicated, 
it could only be limited and the best way of limiting it is by addressing the causes as well as 
using force” (KNUDSEN 2005, P.22).  
All these explanations of internal and external factors which impact the foreign policy of the EU 
confirm the EU’s soft behavior in foreign affairs. Joseph Nye, author of “Europe’s Soft Power”, 
thinks that soft power of European policies could be strong and “can be used to help or hinder 
the United States achievements of its preferred outcomes” (NYE  2004). In terms of “music, 
internet usage and tourism, political asylum and birth expectancy, broad economic 
achievements, public diplomacy and cooperation” (NYE 2004). EU member states are close or 
even ahead of the US in number of achievements.  
The European Union foreign policy dictates a defined way of action. In the world, the EU 
represents itself more as an international organization than a union that could be considered as 
one state.  
The European Union republics maintain a political action in countries where they also do 
business. Usually, countries of the EU are represented in developing countries and trade 
partners  (“The EU is represented in Kazakhstan by 11 Member State Embassies (Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and 
United Kingdom, as well as a Commission Delegation accredited to Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan. Belgium will have an embassy in Astana in the course of 2005”
30
).  
Thus, talking about Kazakhstan, “from the EU’s perspective, Kazakhstan represents a reliable 
partner for promoting its objective of regional stability through regional cooperation in Central 
Asia. Indeed, it must form the cornerstone of any such initiative, given its relative economic 
strength (Kazakhstan accounts for two-thirds of the GDP for the whole central Asian region), 
and its leading position within the region”
31
. Between the EU and Kazakhstan there are a 
number of programs for development and maintenance of the regional stability under the EU 
roof, such as “The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Kazakhstan, initially 
signed in January 1995.  
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In 2002, the dialogue between the two sides was expanded by including energy and transport 
issues into the mandate of the existing Subcommittee on Trade and Investment. The 
Community’s technical assistance program, TACIS, now focused explicitly on PCA 
implementation projects in Central Asia. With the EU major revision of cooperation instruments 
during 2007-2013, Kazakhstan should benefit from the Development Cooperation and 
Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCECI). To ensure continuity with the regional cooperation 
program 2000-2006 and the associated assistance under TACIS Regional Program, 
Kazakhstan also received fundings from the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) 
Eastern Regional Programs based on Art 27 of the ENPI Regulation.  
Aside from the PCA, other bilateral agreements were undergoing between the EU and 
Kazakhstan. These include the Steel Agreement of 2002-2004. Autonomous measures were 
done in 2005. Nuclear Safety Agreement between EURATOM and Kazakhstan became 
operative in June 2003; Nuclear Fusion Cooperation agreement was signed in November 2002 




Most of these agreements demonstrate the interest of the EU as an observer and stability 
keeper through negotiations and agreements that indirectly provide an improvement of trade 
climate and, at the same time, serve the EU member states’ interests. The European 
Commission itself defines its partnership with Kazakhstan as “a Strong Partnership”
 33
 based on 
relations that started as a simple dialogue and expanded widely. “In the early years of 
cooperation this dialogue was initially focused on trade and investment, but since 2002 many 
important issues have been included, such as Energy, Transport, as well as Justice and Home 
Affairs. In parallel to the daily cooperation of the EU Delegation in Kazakhstan with national 
authorities, three annual events are the opportunity to strengthen this partnership: the 
Cooperation Council, Committee and Sub-Committees. These are important fora during which 
major issues of cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU are discussed”
34
. 
Together with growing economic relations, (EU stepped ahead with the initiative to support 
Kazakhstan’s application to join the WTO) the EU relation’s pattern started to became more 
objective-oriented. Finally, the EU, lead by Germany, supported the intention of Kazakhstan to 
become the OSCE chairman country as well as promoted the adoption of a new strategy for 
improved relations with Central Asia.  
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3.2. After 2007                   
Before speaking about the adopted strategy, it is worth talk about the EU-Kazakhstan relations 
since 2007, considered as a “Strong Partnership”.  
Main actions of the EU, regarding economic relations with Kazakhstan, were concentrated on 
direct investments and trade. By 2007, the EU became the number one foreign investor in 
Kazakhstan with “54% of the country's total Foreign Direct Investment”
35
.  
Most of the funds were invested in mining, natural resources extraction, and in geological 
exploration of oil and gas. Small parts of the investment were deposited into a wide range of 




According to data published on the EU Commission Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan site, the EU is the first trading partner of Kazakhstan, and the trading volumes are 
increasing rapidly
37
. The EU export mainly consists of energy resources (over 75% of the total), 
exported for European oil and gas companies, machinery, vehicles, and chemicals.  
Table 3: European Union Trade with Kazakhstan (Mio. Euro)) 
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In order to guarantee safe economic relations, the EU Council officially adopted the new 
strategy on Central Asia in the first half of 2007.  
Sebastien Peyrouse in his "Business and Trade Relationships between the EU and Central 
Asia" published by EUCAM in June 2009 writes that the main idea under the adoption of the 
strategy was the idea to place the EU “in Central Asia in the face of a Chinese presence that is 
growing exponentially and a Russian influence that continues to be strong” (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 
4). It is not only about the placement of the country itself, but also about the safety and security 
of already gained assets and energy issues. 
Sebastien Peyrouse thinks that from the trade perspective, Central Asia is not the first priority of 
the EU. This is also confirmed by the fact that Kazakhstan holds place number 29 in the trade 
partner list of the EU.  
Marat Yermukhanov, a Kazakh journalist, sums up the behavior of Germany published on 
Caucaz.com project: “Would German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier deign to come to 
wind-swept Astana if it were not for the gas row last year between Belarus, Ukraine and Russia 
that shattered Europe's illusion of energy security? That is the question most-asked by analysts 
in Kazakhstan these days. The popular opinion, which is zealously supported by pro-Russian 
officials, is that in the current difficult situation, European nations suffering energy shortages 
need Kazakhstan more than the other way around. EU member-countries' vulnerability to a 
looming energy crisis takes the wind out of Western sails in the long-running argument about 
human rights and democratic standards” (YERMUKHANOV 2007). 
In order to achieve the goal of establishing a stable place in Central Asia and to encounter a 
growing influence of Russia, China and the US, the EU adopted the new strategy for 2007-2013 
that should bring the change in foreign politics. “Since 2007 the EU has sought to speak with a 
more affirmative voice in Central Asia and has started to exert its economic influence; today, it is 
one of the main trading partners of the five states, and is striving to transform the bilateral 
economic relations of its member states into an overall strategy that would have a broader 
impact on Central Asian societies” (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 4). 
“The Strategy for a New Partnership announces EU support for WTO accession for each of the 
four Central Asian states that are not yet members, as well as for improved access for Central 
Asian products to EU markets through the renewed EU Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP – 2006/2015).1 The strategy also aims to encourage exports, economic diversification 
and market-economic structures, in particular by developing public-private partnerships.”  
“The countries of Central Asia are growing more and more significant for Germany's and indeed 
the EU's energy security, and they increasingly play a role in the development of a 
transcontinental transport infrastructure linking Europe, Russia and Asia. The Federal 
Government used the German EU Presidency to provide impetus for more intensive 
cooperation between the European Union and Central Asia” (AUSWARTIGES AMT 2009). As the 
main driving force for the increased partnership, Germany did a lot to promote Central Asia 
within the agenda of German European Parliament rotating presidency started in the first half of Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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2007 and achieved success by official adoption of the document by the European Council 
during Brussel’s summit on June 22
nd 2007.  
“From 30 October to 4 November 2006, during the preparations for Germany's presidency, 
Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier traveled to the region, the first German foreign minister to 
visit all five countries in the Central Asian region: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan und Kyrgyzstan. Germany is the only EU Member State with embassies in all these 
five former Soviet republics. In addition, in accordance with a German initiative, a foreign 
ministers meeting took place in Astana on 28 March between the EU Troika and the Central 
Asian countries, the first in this format and the very first at this senior level. The meeting in 
particular explored the priorities of the Central Asian countries and led to agreement on core 
areas of future cooperation. In parallel, numerous events were organized by the German 
Government during the first half of 2007 with participants from Central Asia; these also helped 
to prepare the Central Asia strategy” (AUSWARTIGES AMT 2009). 
The adopted strategy on Central Asia was called the Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to 
Central Asia
38
 and was planned for a period of 5 years starting in 2007 and ending 2013. This 
strategy declared the goal to help Central Asian countries with stability and to pursuit 
sustainable economic growth to combat poverty and to increase regional cooperation. The 
adopted strategy has a budget of €719 million. 
The program itself has both regional and country related strategies consisting of the so-called 
Multi-Annual Indicative Programs identifying goals, objectives, and funding for each element. 
Programs are set for two periods: 2007-2010 and 2011-2013. There is an Annual Action Plan 
for each country supposed to start after a year of implementation. Kazakhstan has a budget of 
€44 million provided by the EU and available under certain programs to fulfill the reforms in the 
following areas: poverty reduction and raising living standards; regional and local community 
development; reforms in rural development and social sectors; good governance and economic 
reform. 
The new strategy seems to differ a lot from the former EU policy EU towards Central Asia, 
where there was no clear interest of the EU in the region. Now the EU is interested to act in the 
region and to consolidate its power. The main driving force for the change was a overall 
geopolitic situation, where the EU started to lose power in the region: external players as well as 
the region itself and the country (Kazakhstan) started to gain more power in the world, when the 
fight about energy sources became more intensive and when energy recourses were 
concentrated more or less in ‘one hand’. 
According to Sebastien Peyrouse, “The number one European manufacturing power, the 
second-largest exporter in the world in terms of volume, and the fourth-largest economic power 
in the world, Germany is the key partner driving EU relations with Central Asia” (PEYROUSE 
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2009, P. 6).  The long-term relationship between Kazakhstan and Germany has historical roots 
connected to the German diaspora in the country that consisted of more than 1 million of people 
in early 90s. Until today, most of Kazakh Germans have left the country to go to Germany. 
Kazakhstan is also the third biggest German trade partner after Russia and Ukraine with a high 
share of small and medium business (according to data, presented by Peyrouse, 80% of 
economic activities of Germany are made by small and medium-sized companies that are 
interested in doing business with the region and are lobbying their interests).   
With the help of Germany, the EU changed its acting on the global scene, at least, in the region 
of Central Asia, where the Union began to implement a new policy in 2007.  
4. KAZAKHSTAN: CHANGING POWER 
4.1 Before 2007 
The Central Asian region is a region of low political stability. For instance, Uzbekistan was 
always considered as a country with the most repressive regime and low income economy. 
Kyrgyzstan is a country with low-income economy adopting politic strategies from Russia and 
the US. Gas-rich Turkmenistan is almost an authoritarian country with an international negative 
image that hinder new investments.   
Three countries of the region have one border with Afghanistan, a country faced with war and 
terror. Central Asia is also known for having corrupt societies, violations of human rights, 
missing journalists and deporting diplomats and activists. This picture also hinders foreign 
investors to perform small or medium sized enterprises. 
In the first years of the country’s independence, Kazakhstan declared itself as a democratic 
republic aiming to build a free market economy and diverge from being a ‘tasty morsel’. Once, 
the country gained its independence in 1991, it has taken multidimensional foreign policy 
approaches. Kazakhstan joined several international and regional cooperation organizations in 
order to secure it and to establish open external relations with its close neighbors as well as with 
foreign players based on negotiations.  
In December 1991, Kazakhstan joined the CIS. In May 1992, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization rejected nuclear weapon usage and closed its polygons. Such decisions were 
highly welcomed in the West and immediately positively changed the view about the involved 
countries. Kazakhstan also signed all possible agreements about border regulations (with 
China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Turkmenistan) that helped the country to establish its 
sovereign borders and maintain its security.  
Participating in regional cooperation organizations such as CIS or Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, Kazakhstan acted mostly as an initiator and promoted the idea of regional 
cooperation. In 2002, Kazakhstan initiated regular summits dedicated to the idea of 
collaboration and trust measures in Asia including 20 participating countries. Continuing to Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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improve the international image of the country, Kazakhstan joined the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe in 1992.   
Such foreign policy was considered as an improvement towards democracy and free market 
economy together with the establishment of auspicious business conditions leading to an 
improvement in economics’ and investors’ ratings (Fitch long-term credit ratings growth, 
Standard and Poor's Rating growth, etc.). Kazakhstan’s country risk profile decreased, 
according to FITA, the Federation of International Trade Associations, to the risk value of 3 (10 
= highes risk, 1=lowest risk).
39
  




In 2004-2006, foreign direct investments almost doubled their amount and continued to grow. 
The  GDP per capita in 2006 also doubled and reached USD 5253 per capita. The inflation rate 
was low at 6.9%. The country’s banking system was rated as the best and most profitable 
among CIS countries. The country started to develop service and construction spheres.  
In 2006, the economic and political situation in Kazakhstan was promising which made 
Germany and the EU to rethink their relations with the country from just being an observational 
partner towards a more concrete trade partner. Additionally, German officials traveling to the 
region confirmed that Kazakhstan will play an important role in the EU energy security policy.  
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4.2 After 2007                   
During the years of progress and policy-making towards a democracy and a sustainable 
economic growth, Kazakhstan proved to have the highest progress among the Central Asian 
countries. “To many outside government officials' efforts to reconcile age-old authoritarian rule 
with new democratic challenges may seem to be successful. Broadly speaking, in comparison 
with Uzbekistan which has been ostracized by the West for the Andijan massacre or turbulent 
Kyrgyzstan and impoverished Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan is a better place for democracy to 
prosper” (YERMUKHANOV 2007).  
Kazakhstani politicians used fair dialogues and negotiated with the EU and convinced them that 
the country is important for the future of European energy companies. Therefore, “the EU 
attached much hope to some of the positive developments in Kazakhstan such as budding 
judicial reform, a comparatively good human rights records and efforts to amend the media law 
and to protect the rights of ethnic minorities (YERMUKHANOV 2007). Furthermore, EU officials 
promised to support Kazakhstan bid to WTO accession and supported its candidate for the 
OSCE chairman position. “The head of the German Foreign Affairs Ministry Frank-Walter 
Steinmeyer meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Kasymzhomart Tokayev even 
underlined that "the presidency of Kazakhstan will help the country to discover the potential of 
this international organization and give the additional impulse to the democratization processes 
in the country” (JETPYSPAYEVA 2006). 
The EU fulfilled its promise and was even more dedicated to the idea of support the largest (and 
the energy richest) Central Asian republic, and to succeed in becoming an important political 
and economic partner who can actually influence the decision-making process. The EU even 
ignored obvious and serious claims by the world publicity about the Kazakhstani government, 
having “dirty hands” and not performing needed political reforms, during the OSCE Ministerial 
Council meeting in December 2006 in Brussels. As a result, Kazakhstan received one more 
year to fulfill the reforms and the OSCE residency chair for 2010. 
“Holding only intergovernmental negotiations are not enough. If decided to hold the OSCE 
Presidency 2009, it is not so much time left for the reforms the country needs to carry out from 
inside. Political agreements and high level meetings when Kazakhstan declares high aims and 
intentions to achieve is one side of the coin. But when it is "supported" by such things as 
became traditional elections legislation violation which the international observers declare all the 
time. When the media and information law is changed in a way opposite to democratic. When 
the press is writing about the tragic struggle between people living in Shanyrak district of Almaty 
with a police to protect their houses from the local administration and court decision. Not 
mentioning the right-wheel cars ban on the eve of the WTO accession which leads to the car 
drivers' demonstrations all over Kazakhstan. The police block the streets and International 
Media reports how the guardians made people keep silence. Or the last but not least issue - 
destruction of the houses where the representatives of "Society of Krishna Perception" live and 
demand "to reject their religious belief and make in this case possible the legalization of Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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property as it happened before with the reps of other religious confessions" (as it is said in the 
document signed by two laborists and one liberal democrat on the eve of the Nursultan 
Nazarbayev's visit to the UK, reported by Newsru.com).These events became rather political 
and did not remind to a democratic state where everyone has a freedom of speech. This 
political behavior of different power levels in Kazakhstan shadowed the aim which the country 
declared saying "We need the OSCE Presidency" (JETPYSPAYEVA 2006). 
Several Kazakhstani political observers, including Marat Yermukhanov, as well as Western 
journalists highly criticized the EU foreign policy behavior towards the region. Giving the OSCE 
chair position to a country such as Kazakhstan will confirm that the organization standards are 
not followed, if the position is given to an authoritarian regime, where human rights and 
freedoms are violated.  
Political analysts expressed their negative opinions and skepticism during the round tables and 
conferences starting in 2007 in Kazakhstan and Europe by saying that during the presidency 
itself, Kazakhstan will be obliged to face all the violation it did before where the country always 
used a “country specific” excuse. Due to this excuse, the country prevented any external 
interference into domestic policy and kept its own issues unchanged, continuing to execute 
repressive reforms. For instance, the internet regulation law, adopted in June 2009, equaled all 
web-sources to mass media in legal terms and introduced a self-censorship for all Kazakhstani 
web-source to be banned based on court decision. Kazakhstani journalists together with legal 
activists and world community representatives including OSCE were having several round-
tables nationally and internationally protest actions and internet campaigns, but did not succeed 
in changing anything. They all hoped the president himself, who was warned several times by 
the world community including OSCE high authorities that the country is not fulfilling the 
obligations, will veto the legislation as presiding under OSCE in 2010, but unfortunately he 
signed the law on July 11
th, 2009. Kazakhstani authorities did express their anger that they did 
not want such political actions as in Moldova or Iran.  
One may, of course, argue that the country cares about its security and stability which is good 
for an economic climate and investments, as well as for national and foreign companies 
including Europe, but in this case, the freedom of speech is violated as well as the Basic Law of 
the republic of Kazakhstan.  
“It is hardly surprising that European democratic institutions carefully avoid harsh language 
when addressing Kazakh authorities even in cases of obvious violations of democratic norms. 
When independent journalist Kazis Toguzbayev was given two-year suspended sentence last 
January for allegedly infringing upon the honor of the president, the EU limited its protest to a 
mildly worded statement. The mysterious deaths of political figures and journalists Zamanbek 
Nurkadilov, Altynbek Sarsenbayev, Askhat Sharipzhanov, Batyrkhan Darimbet and Nuri Muftakh 
went almost unnoticed by the international community” (YERMUKHANOV 2007). 
The EU continued the silent policy even after 2007, when all OSCE remarks have been 
suggested and the Kazakhstan policy remained unchanged and was getting to become even Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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more repressing.  EU diplomats attempted to talk and discuss sensitive issues, such as human 
rights, and religious minorities’ rights violation with international organization representatives 
and via mass media addressing Kazakhstan and other countries of the region. However, these 
attempts remained neglected.  
“EU countries are among the leaders in supporting human rights programs in Central Asia and 
efforts in this area have produced some positive results. However, the EU has raised the issue 
of freedom of the media only partially in Kyrgyzstan but not in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan” 
(TORALIEVA 2009, P. 4). On the other hand, for instance, Anna Carlswriter, OSCE Advisor on 
Mass Media Freedom, during the round table held in Almaty, expressed several times that a 
‘filter’ should be placed by each internet user himself, but not by the state or government 
because any filter policy both local and international is absolutely contradictory to a free flow of 
information principles (VOLKOV 2009, P. 2).  
Politics are frostily because “the current EU engagement in Central Asia is shaped by the 
interests of large companies, mainly in the energy sector” (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 10), and they do 
not want to lose their influence. Even though, they try to make attempts or behave like they are 
trying, cooperation does not seem to be working with Central Asian leaders. “Central Asian 
countries know that Western policy makers put business before politics when it deals with the 
energy-rich region. Frank-Walter Steinmeier was no exception in that respect. His counterparts 
from Central Asia eagerly discussed energy cooperation, but his calls for human rights and rule 
of law in the region fell largely on deaf ears. Turkmenistan’s foreign minister did not appear for 
the joint press-conference. Vladimir Norov, foreign minister of Uzbekistan could not conceal his 
irritation, saying that his country would not tolerate any outside interference” (PEYROUSE 2009, 
P. 10). 
The behavior of the five Central Asian authoritarian regimes, including Kazakhstan, could be 
described from being ‘just cool’ to ‘irritated’ when they are reminded about sensitive issues or 
domestic policy. Local governments do everything to keep external power out from the domestic 
policies. At the same time, government officials welcome any negotiations, visits, and talks 
about business relations. For instance, “arriving with an attractive energy cooperation scheme 
including the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline project, Polish President Lech Kaczyñski's visit 
to Astana in the wake of the EU Troika was more welcome than that of the German foreign 
minister. The visit was further sweetened by Polish support for Kazakhstan’s coveted OSCE 
chairmanship in 2009 and a voiced intention to draw Kazakhstan into mediation between the EU 
and Russia” (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 10). 
Kazakhstan declared its multidimensional foreign policy in the mid-90s, but ten years later, in 
2006-2007, it started to perform a ‘real’ foreign policy behavior mostly concentrating on its 
economic sector. Starting in 2004, the government of Kazakhstan began to diversify its relations 
and contracts in oil and gas industry to gain more stability and power in the world. For instance, 
since 2004, it participates in Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that goes to the West through 
Russia. In 2005, Kazakhstan finished construction works on Kazakhstan-China Pipeline “Atasu-Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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Alashankou” to the East. The country also takes part in the South oil pipeline project called 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) in Turkey since 2006, supported by the US, and is thinking about the 
European gas project – Nabucco.  
From this part of the policy, Kazakhstan was participating in different projects to achieve 
democracy and using negotiations to reach goals. In 2007, Kazakhstan became an important 
and powerful regional leader and able to influence policy-making in the neighboring gas-rich 
country Turkmenistan. Further, it executed policy of friendship and neighborhood with Russia 
and the Far East.  
It is also very important to mention why Europe became depended on Kazakhstan in the region. 
From 2006 on, relations between the EU and Russia faced a negative development. The gas 
conflict with the Urkaine, Baltics states, and Poland ended in a rejection to negotiate any energy 
deals connected to Russia. By 2008, the EU and Russian energy relations were at a point, 
where even Europe had no other measures left than issuing a document, regulating export 
duties and limitations for raw materials export, made by the European Commission and its 
Commissioner on Trade, Peter Mandelson. Together with other issues, this made the EU 
search for other ways of an energy supply and become active on promoting the Nabucco gas 
project.  
Analysts say this was the real reason for the EU to adopt the new strategy on Central Asia and 
act as an active partner in the region. By the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007, the 
Kazakhstan foreign policy could not change dramatically, and even getting the OSCE 
presidency, did not stop the country from acting autonomously neglecting world mass media 
criticism and political pressure. The country continued to adopt domestic laws that contradict all 
democratic standards. Kazakhstan failed to show that it is going to serve as an example for 
other countries in reforming its political system towards democracy. It failed each criterion the 
OSCE suggested.   
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main reason for blaming the EU for not watching the regional reforms more often is based 
on the idea that the EU has a chance to stimulate and positively influence developments in 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan and to provide a democratic social model. 
Many analysts think the EU could use economic relations and business ties in the region for the 
sake of social development and vice versa arguing that social instability affects the EU business 
relations forcing Kazakhstani government to finally solve problems and execute necessary 
democratic reforms.  
For instance, Sebastien Peyrouse sees the following behavior: “In theory, Europe could make 
use of its business potential to help spread the social model it incarnates. The EU could thus 
choose to privilege business relations that commit the participants to ensuring certain legal 
standards in economic activity and to strengthening the rule of law. This could be done, for Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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instance, by giving preference to Central Asian companies that are committed to respecting the 
rights of local workers, to fighting corruption, promoting fair competition and good corporate 
governance, and recognizing the importance of contracts. The long-term objective would be to 
increase the social responsibility of Central Asian companies – something that has indirect 
repercussions on the societies” (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 11). Nevertheless, he also doubts that it 
can be easily done because of possible accusations by using “its own doorstep to tax heavens – 
particularly in Luxembourg - where Central Asian heads of state, their families and the oligarchs 
close to them deposit money siphoned off from national wealth” (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 11). 
However, the history of the EU as a welfare union of states is more powerful than the use of 
accusations. Therefore, European politicians may successfully use economic ties, contacts, and 
obligations in long-term trade relations to influence the government to provide better social 
reforms to secure stability, as well as strengthen the power of the EU as an external player in 
the region. In this case, the economic topic should serve as a basis for the European strategy in 
the region. “The EU therefore has every reason to implement forms of development assistance 
which, by helping European companies to establish themselves in the market, will play a key 
role in reducing Central Asia’s social vulnerability and will contribute to the fight against poverty, 
which is currently the main issue that needs to be addressed by the international community 
and by regional governments” (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 11). 
Continuation of this strategy that will enforce Kazakhstani government to provide the society 
with necessary reforms will gain a positive image for the union both within the region and 
globally. This also may help the EU, as an external player, to further obtain influence on 
governmental decision-making processes. It is obvious that social stability is the key to 
decrease economical risk factors and to improve the investment climate to benefit the whole 
development of a country or union. In this case, the EU strategy will profit the EU itself. Chances 
for a successful realization of such a plan are relatively high.    
Kazakhstan has been conduction fruitful business with EU Member States. According to the 
statistics, provided by the German Auswaertiges Amt, Germany takes place number eight in the 
list of Kazakhstan trading partners with a commodity turnover of EUR 5.7 billion in 2008, and it 
continues to grow (AUSWAERTIGES  AMT  2009). “In this area, Kazakhstan does not hide its 
ambitions; its “Path to Europe” program clearly states its intention to become one of the main 
communications hubs between Asia and Europe” (PEYROUSE  2009, P .  9),  according to 
Sebastien Peyrouse, who specialized on Central Asian trade and economic relations.  
The program called “Path to Europe” was signed by the President in August 2008 and supposed 
to be implemented during 2009-2011. According to evaluations made by the EU and 
Kazakhstani political analysts, the program will help to intensify and deepen the political 
collaboration between Kazakhstan and the EU. The introduction of the program has 3 stages 
and the basis for implementation of the program was prepared carefully. First of all, the 
president addressed his hopes for future profitable relations with the EU beforehand, in his 
annual message to the people of Kazakhstan. This message was used by Kazakhstani officials Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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during political meetings to announce the future document. Finally, the document was signed 
and came into force in August 2008.  
The program seemed to be very promising. For instance, in March 2008, during the conference 
in the Netherlands, organized with the help of the Kazakhstan embassy, the ambassador of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Mainura Murzamadiyeva, familiarized more than 70 representatives of 
political, informational, and business layers of the Netherlands with the President’s message to 
the people of Kazakhstan, where he had announced the future program. Many of Dutch political 
scientists stated that the proposals the president made in his message will definitely intensify 
political cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU, attract foreign investments, bring new 
technologies, and help to bring people of different regions close to each other.   
Analyzing the program “Path to Europe” that is celebrating its first anniversary this August, since 
it was signed in 2008, the following objectives are performed by the government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan:  
  Cooperation with the EU countries; 
  Creation of required conditions for technological cooperation; 
  Energy cooperation development; 
  Transport cooperation development; 
  Technical regulation and metrology cooperation; 
  Trade-economic relation strengthening and broadening; 
  Small and medium-sized enterprises development; 
  Living conditions improvement cooperation; 
 Humanitarian  cooperation; 
  Kazakhstani legal base improvement and European experience application. 
Kazakhstan clearly stated that it expects the level of a strategic partnership with leading 
European countries in political, economic, and humanitarian spheres and a trade commodity 
turnover increase by 10% per year as well as a high level of exchange visits. The country also 
expects the EU to help to promote Kazakhstan internationally which will improve the investment 
climate and, therefore, the economic situation.  
However, priorities of the country remain unclear showing the country’s reluctance to answer 
the questions on how to establish democracy and solve the following problems “continuation of 
efforts on creation of conditions for democracy institutions development on the OSCE territory; 
transport and transit potential development; Eurasian transcontinental transport corridors 
development; ecological problems solutions; trust measures and regional security 
strengthening; non-military aspects of safety development under the OSCE activities including Changing Politics in Central Asia. The Case of Kazakhstan 
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To reach the declared goals and priorities, Kazakhstan needs the support of the EU and 
cooperation. Many political and business analysts provide recommendations suggesting to 
establish trade chambers and delegation sections related to trade and business that will monitor 
the activities, provide more legal support and consultations for small and medium-sized 
business in the region. Further, they suggest establishing more exchange programs for 
Kazakhstani businessmen to bring more business culture and experience. To monitor and 
evaluate the progress, the EU can establish clear and visible rating systems with distinct 
conditions and deadlines. In this case, evaluation committees and reports with full transparency 
are crucial.    
However, the first step, the EU should fulfill, is to admit that the time of ‘soft power’ has ended 
and finally declare a clear political dimension. Without a distinctive view and goal, the EU will 
not succeed in representing a strong power and will not improve the policy that has been 
executing in Kazakhstan since signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1992. 
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